American Petroleum Institute
DHSNonrulemakingDHS-2009-0026

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard, PRA Notices for Comments on New Personnel Surety Information Collection Request

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American Petroleum Institute filings
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American Petroleum Institute filed 1 comment on this docket between Aug 11, 2009 and Aug 11, 2009. 4 other organizations filed here. The comment window closed 5920d ago.

What American Petroleum Institute filed (1)

Aug 11, 2009· Comment Submitted by Robin Rorick, American Petroleum Institute· DHS-2009-0026-0017

August 10, 2009 Department of Homeland Security National Protection and Programs Directorate Office of Infrastructure Protection Re: Docket No. DHS-2009-0026 The American Petroleum Institute (API) is pleased to offer the following comments in response to the U. S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposed collection of information request. API represents over 400 member companies involved in all aspects of the oil and natural gas industry and, as such, could be adversely impacted by this Agency action. General Comments API and its member companies believe it is important to provide effective personnel surety at high-risk chemical facilities to ensure that individuals with unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets have suitable backgrounds checks. API and its members support a Personnel Surety Program (PSP) that can efficiently and effectively check appropriate Personally Identifiable Information (PII) against the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). However, API and its members are concerned about several aspects of how the PSP program will be administered in accordance with 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv) of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS), as described in the June 10, 2009 information collection request. In general, API is concerned that DHS has not provided enough detail about the program to make a reasonable estimate of either the positive or negative impact it may have. As an example, there is no information provided as to the specifics that is to be collected or otherwise known as Personally Identifiable Information (PII). If a physical description of the individual is required to be given, a host of concerns would arise in regards to the qualifications of those individuals required to make that assessment. Additionally, companies would be very concerned from a profiling standpoint and there would be great sensitivities from both the submitter and the submitted. The extent of PII required is also concerning from the perspective of needless and duplicative reporting burden. Typically, minimal information is useful in making an initial determination as to whether an individual is of concern, and then subsequently more information about that person can be gathered during a more involved investigation. Ultimately, API and its members have great concerns about the total impacted population from this program, and believe strongly that DHS must conduct and show the results of its analysis to this effect to ensure the program is as efficient as possible and not duplicative in any way. DHS also does not explain how often PII will need to be updated by a facility. Maintenance of PII required by a facility could be extremely cumbersome. Many facilities have authorized contractors who have access to multiple facilities but are not employees of the facility. Under the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program, these types of workers are effectively addressed since the PII vetting process is tied to the individual and NOT the facility. Under this program, each individual will be required to keep his/her PII up to date and submitted to DHS for each facility that s/he has unrestricted access to. It is unclear how this information will be reviewed, checked for quality, coordinated with other facilities, or how often it will need to be updated. Personnel vetting should be tied to the individual and not to a facility. Personnel vetting should be tied to the individual and not to a facility. By requiring each high-risk facility to report PII on all personnel who have unescorted access to restricted areas, including company employees and contractors, it will create duplicative reporting for each facility that an individual has access to. This is unnecessary and inefficient and will likely result in multiple records for the same individual. Additionally, it will vastly increase the potential for error, inconsistent results, and potentially significant complications in the even…

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